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The recent war in Gaza has provoked much concern about an ‚import‛ of 
tensions from the Middle East to Europe. Yet, the perception of this conflict 
among young Muslims and immigrants does not exclusively derive from the 
actual events in the Eastern Mediterranean, but has as much to do with these 
youngsters daily life in Berlin, Paris or London. In the recent years, the con-
flict has turned into a metaphor that allows rallying for Muslim unity against 
injustice. As an identity marker, ‚Palestine‛ has entered Muslim youth cul-
ture in Germany – and in Europe in general – to symbolize a shared struggle 
against discrimination of Muslims and attacks against Islam. 
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       alestine – built to last‚ – the Germany based online-shop comuni-t chose this label 
for one of its t-shirts. ‚I dream of a free Palestine‛ goes another slogan sold on the web-
site of muslim-shirt, a small street wear label based in the provincial town of Wuppertal. 
These online-shops aim at providing ‚street wear for the umma‛1, the borderless com-
munity of Islam, and cater to a younger generation of Muslims that since the late 90s 
slowly emerged in various European countries. As representatives of ‚Pop-Islam‛ as 
this trend has come to be known in German debates on contemporary Islam, these 
youngsters stand for a simultaneous assertion of Muslimness and a belonging to West-
ern societies. The self-confident description as ‚Muslim, young and German‛2 is popu-
larized by organizations such as the Muslim Youth in Germany, just as slogans like 
‚Muslim and British‛ and ‚Muslim and French‛ echo similar patterns of identity 
among Muslim youngsters in the UK or France. 
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict provides an opportunity to foster these believers’ 
identity and to rally for Muslim unity and communal action. The protracted conflict in 
the occupied territories, i.e. West Bank and the Gaza Strip has been an important focal 
point among immigrants with Middle Eastern and Turkish background in Europe for 
long time. While immigrants from Israel/Palestine, who have personally experienced 
the consequences of the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories, represent only 
a minor segment of European Muslims, the persisting conflict with Israel continues to 
impact on public opinion among Muslims and Middle Eastern immigrants. The so-
called al-Aqsa-Intifada (2000-2005) was a case in point.3 With numerous public events 
and large rallies in major European cities, the conflict drew considerable attention 
among immigrants and beyond. Coinciding with the repeated violent escalations of the 
conflict as the Israeli offensive on the Palestinian refugee camp Jenin in April 2002, the 
                                                          
1 See the website: comuni-t.com. (accessed on Apr. 15th, 2009) 
2 See the website of Muslim Youth in Germany: mjd-net.de. (accessed on Apr. 15th 2009) 
3 Another occasion that received broad attention was the commemoration of the 60th anniversary of the 
nakba, the ‚catastrophe‛ provoked by the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. Dozens of events were 
organized in 2008 throughout Germany in memory of the expulsion and flight of some 700.000 Palestini-
an-Arabs. With regard to Shiites, the annual Quds Day manifestations on the last Friday in the month of 
Ramadan are important occasions to rally for the ‚liberation‛ of Jerusalem. The Quds Day was initiated by 
Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979; with regard to the ideological background of the event and its echoes in 
Germany, see Wolter, Udo: Beispiel Al-Quds-Tag. Islamistische Netzwerke und Ideologien unter Migrantinnen 
und Migranten in Deutschland und Möglichkeiten zivilgesellschaftlicher Intervention (Berlin, 2004).  
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protests culminated in massive demonstrations, often leading to tensions between local 
Muslim and Jewish communities in Paris, Amsterdam or Berlin. According to an EU 
report on manifestations of antisemitism in Europe in the period between 2002 and 
2003, the height of the fighting in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, young Muslims 
with immigrant background appeared for the time among identified groups of perpe-
trators of anti-Jewish attacks.4 
The war in Gaza in December 2008 and January 2009 added to the importance of the 
conflict in popular perceptions among Muslims and Middle Eastern immigrants, with 
observers again pointing to growing agitation and an increasing number of anti-Jewish 
incidents.5 While anti-Jewish stereotypes and the spread of antisemitic resentment 
among Muslim youngsters are increasingly identified as a considerable problem, the 
origin of this phenomenon remains disputed. During the Gaza war, news reports about 
the impact of the tensions in the Middle East for Europe again made the headlines, as 
Europe supposedly ‚reimports Jew hatred‛ from the ‚Arab street‛ in Gaza, Cairo and 
Damascus.6 In this respect, a possible impact of Arab and Islamic media such as the 
TV-channels al-Jazeera and al-Manar – a Lebanese channel affiliated to Hizbullah – was 
frequently highlighted.7 Yet, the image of an ‚import‛ or ‚spill-over‛ of tensions from 
the Eastern Mediterranean ignores the local contexts in which the protests against the 
war and the widespread identification with the population in Gaza are placed, and 
neglects these protests’ local significance. While the events of the war and the high 
number of civilian victims were the ultimate trigger for the massive protests, these ma-
nifestations also illustrate the search for a collective identity in which many of the par-
ticipating youngsters are engaged. Posing as a member of a larger Muslim community 
that is under attack, the protests reflected a considerable frustration and discontent 
about this youth’s standing in German society. 
                                                          
4 European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia: Manifestations of Antisemitism in the EU 2002-
2003 (Vienna, 2004): 20-22. See also AMIRA: „Du Opfer!“ – „Du Jude!“ Antisemitismus und Jugendarbeit in 
Kreuzberg (Berlin, 2009) and Amadeu Antonio Stiftung: „Die Juden sind schuld”. Antisemitismus in der Ein-
wanderungsgesellschaft am Beispiel muslimisch sozialisierter Milieus (Berlin, 2009). 
5 See for instance Banks, Martin, ‚Rise in anti-Semitic incidents across EU linked to Gaza crisis‛, The par-
liament.com, 2 March 2009.  
6 „Europe Reimports Jew Hatred‚, Wall Street Journal, 13 Jan.  2009. 
7 See „Schäuble verbietet Hisbollah-Sender Al Manar‚, telepolis.de (Nov. 25th 2008). 





“Palestine” and lifestyle  
Since the first days of the war in late December, members and sympathizers from vari-
ous Muslim and immigrant organizations joined in the protests against the massive 
attacks on Gaza. While various organizations with non-immigrant and non-Muslim 
background supported the calls for demonstrations, many of the rallies and events 
were initiated by Muslims and/or immigrants of Arab and Turkish background. Rang-
ing from the secular-oriented organization of the Palestinian Community in Berlin to the 
moderate Turkish-Islamist Islamic Community Millî Görüş, the rallies brought together 
tens of thousands of participants from different ends of the political and religious spec-
trum. Even fringe groups such as the Islamist grouping Hizb ut-Tahrir, though out-
lawed in Germany since 2003, and several associations with Salafist orientation took 
part in the protests, often joining the rallies that were organized by mainstream Mus-
lim actors. One of the striking features of these activities was the prominence of 
youngsters among the demonstrations’ participants. The interest of young Muslims to 
engage in rallies and the concern and anger voiced on these occasions mirror the topi-
cality of ‚Palestine‛ in informal discussions among peers, in daily life and lifestyle. Yet, 
these references to Palestine do not necessarily allude to the actual Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict; in fact, knowledge about the actual conflict and its historical background is 
often scarce.8 Instead, in many statements and expressions that were made during 
these protests, Palestine had turned into a metaphorical trope whose implied meaning 
largely exceeds an allusion to the numerous victims and large-scale destruction result-
ing from the repeated confrontations with the Israeli army. While Muslims have be-
come victims in major wars and military conflicts of the recent past, it is the Palestine 
conflict that has turned into a symbol for the plight of the Muslim community and Is-
lam. While the numbers of Muslim victims in the wars in Algeria (1991-2002), Bosnia 
(1992-1996) and Chechnya (1994-1996 and 1999-2006) – and in the ongoing genocide in 
Darfur – were considerably higher than in the Palestinian territories, it is this conflict 
that has gained most, and near exclusive, attention. Given the religious importance of 
Palestine and Jerusalem in particular in Islamic tradition, the allusion to ‚Palestine‛ 
serves as a strong marker of one’s religious identity.  
                                                          
8 See for instance Arnold, Sina/Jikeli, Günther, Judenhass und Gruppendruck – Zwölf Gespräche mit jun-
gen Berlinern palästinensischen und libanesischen Hintergrunds, in: Benz, Wolfgang (ed.): Jahrbuch für 
Antisemitismusforschung 17 (Berlin, 2008): 105-130. The significance of the conflicts in the Middle East – and 
the Palestine conflict in particular – for Islamist currents in Germany is highlighted in The Change Insti-
tute: Studies into violent radicalization. The beliefs, ideologies and narratives (London, 2008): 79-80. 





That said, repercussions of 
the confrontations in the Gaza 
Strip and the West Bank can be 
traced in Muslim youngsters’ 
daily life. Similar to the online-
shop comuni-t, the German-
Muslim lifestyle label Styleis-
lam has taken up the recent 
conflict and produced t-shirts 
and buttons calling for an end 
to the fightings in Gaza.9 The 
motive ‚Gaza: Stop the killing 
now‛ is one of few slogans 
touching on explicitly political 
issues; in contrast, most other 
motives entail a straight for-
ward religious message: ‚Hi-
jab. My right, my choice, my 
life‛, ‚Read Quran. Charge 
your Iman (faith)‛ and ‚Umma – be part of it‛ read some of these slogans that allow 
both identifying as believers and calling others to Islam. (see Pic. 1) In this, these mo-
tives clearly mirror the message the producers want to transmit, with ‚Palestine‛ sym-
bolizing a shared – though rather abstract – concern of the label’s audience. In its self-
description, the label states: 
“Our label Styleislam stands for modern lifestyle products in the street style 
and casual wear-sector, always with a touch of the Orient, because this is 
where our roots are. We design clothes, but that’s not all, we also offer mu-
sic tracks and videos by and for our brothers, sisters and interested people. 
A multimedia product package with style and character – just the thing for 
the young Islamic community. The sketches, motifs and slogans on our 
products are not only funky, they also have content. We communicate Is-
                                                          
9 The motives of the label are also available as avatars, used as icons of virtual identity in community net-
works such as Facebook. Among the accessories sold on the website are mouse-pads, see styleislam.com. 
(accessed Apr. 13rd, 2009) The significance of the conflicts in the Middle East – and the Palestine conflict in 
particular – for Islamist currents in Germany is highlighted in The Change Institute: Studies into violent 
radicalization. The beliefs, ideologies and narratives (London, 2008): 79-80. 
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lam in a language young people can understand, without sacrificing our 
values in the process. Styleislam – go spread the word.‛10 
The appropriation of street culture to stage one’s religious identity and to voice the 
message of the Quran is one of the characteristics of Pop-Islam as expressed in the trend 
linked to these labels. Being cool and street-credible, while at the same time submitting 
to traditional Islamic values and norms, has gained this current considerable attention 
among young Muslims of diverse backgrounds. As such, many of these trends, labels 
and websites stand for modern Islamic lifestyles that are not limited by national boun-
daries; as in the case of Styleislam, most of these exponents of Muslim youth culture 
explicitly address a larger Muslim audience in Europe, as well as in the Arab and Is-
lamic world. Their message is directed as much to local German, British or Danish au-
diences as it is meant to appeal to the transnational Muslim umma. 
References to ‚Palestine‛ are part of the community construction in these currents – 
with music being an important facet of this youth culture. During the last few years, 
Islamic hip-hop and pop has emerged as a major stage for Muslim artists to voice their 
views and visions and to raise issues important to Muslim youngsters. Even groups 
such as the Danish trio Outlandish that is not exclusively of Muslim background fre-
quently raise religious issues and consider their music a venue to address religious 
concerns and to voice religious messages. Other bands and singers such as the German 
hip hopper Ammar114 explicitly view their music as part of dawa-activities, the ‚invita-
tion‛ of others to Islam, which is considered a religious obligation in conservative and 
Salafist currents.11 
The label ‚7th century record‛ is an example of such music, with ‚Palestine‛ featur-
ing as a key topic in its productions. The label, which is promoted by the UK-based 
project Muslimrap and linked to in German-Muslim internet sites and online communi-
ties, describes its aim as  
‚raising awareness and consciousness regarding the state of our world to-
day through the medium of music, song, hip hop and poetry. With this 
goal in mind, and to inform as well as to entertain, our label has embarked 
                                                          
10 styleislam.com. (accessed Apr. 13rd 2009) 
11 See interview with Ammar114 in Islamische Zeitung (May 21st 2008). For an insight into the history and 
the religious background of Islamic hip hop, see Mohaiemen, Naeem: Fear of a Muslim Planet: The Islamic 
roots of hip-hop (MIT Press, DJ Spooky ed., 2008). 





on a conscious initiative to tell the story of Palestine through creative and 
artistic musical expression of the facts, truths, the lies, pain and hope that is 
Palestine today.‛12 
The CD-compilation ‚Palestine – The album‛ matches these intentions. While many 
of its songs address the hardship and suffering of the Palestinian population, the allu-
sion to the situation in Palestine is not limited to humanitarian concerns. The song ‚Je-
nin‛ (Cataclysm) that refers to the Israeli military operations in the Palestinian refugee 
camp in April 2002 exemplarily depicts the experience of the conflict as a challenge to 
devout believers. Pointing to the city in the West Bank, the song’s lyrics include an im-
agined dialogue that highlights a spiritual importance attributed to this place:  
‚’I give you one name that means so much to me: Jenin.’ *You might ask:+ 
‘Jenin?! Jenin is just place in Palestine.’ ‘I tell you: No. Jenin is a place that 
makes me wanna be a better believer, everyday a better believer.‛13  
While many of the groups promoted on Muslimrap address an audience of Islamist 
orientation – with bands such as Soldiers of Allah being tied to the Islamist movement of 
Hizb ut-Tahrir – other Muslim groups reach out to a mainstream Muslim public. As an 
example, the British singer Sami Yusuf has gained considerable popularity in Germa-
ny, with his Azeri background contributing to his renommé among youngsters with 
Turkish family backgrounds. Following his two previous albums, ‚Al-Muallim‛ (‚The 
Teacher‛) and ‚My ummah‛ (‚My community *of believers+‛), that had been sold in 
several millions of copies, his most recent album again focuses on religion and his ex-
perience as a Muslim – with the song ‚Forever Palestine‛ explicitly addressing the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Yusuf focuses in the song on the role of children in the con-
frontation with the Israeli army and uses them as an illustration of the Palestinian 
struggle as a righteous one before God, but also against tyranny as such. While the 
Palestinian side might have to temporarily submit to the power of Israel’s military 
strength, it is God himself who will ‚put the oppressors right‛ and re-establish justice. 
Palestine, here again, stands for a larger cause Muslims have to struggle for: 
‚Children of Palestine are fighting for their lives. They say to their parents, 
‘we know that Palestine is our right’. They say to their parents, ‘we'll fight 
                                                          
12 See a description of the project on the website muslimrap.net. (accessed Apr. 13rd 2009) 
13 The song is available on the website muslimrap.net. (accessed Apr. 13rd 2009) 





for what is right’. They say, ‘not to worry! God is on our side’. They say, 
‘we'll die for Palestine’. Palestine, forever Palestine.‛14 
The importance given to ‚Palestine‛ as a topos is mirrored in Yusuf’s participation 
in a fundraising event for the victims of the Gaza war that was organized in Doha 
(UAE). Being described on his website as ‚devoutly spiritual‛ and as aiming at ‚pro-
moting the messages of love, mercy, peace and tolerance, whilst encouraging the youth 
to be proud of their identity‛15, Yusuf implicitly depicts the struggle for ‚Palestine‛ as 
a key element of today’s Muslims’ concerns. 
 
Belonging and political action 
Important in this respect is the use of modern media as facilitating the formation of 
identificatorial bonds around shared interests and preoccupations. Calls for demon-
strations in protest of the Gaza-war circulated in dozens of German-Muslim online 
forums and received considerable attention by its users. In addition, fundraising events 
were organized by various organizations and attracted much support through mailing-
lists and cross-postings on weblogs and in chat-rooms; online-forums such as the pop-
ular Shia-Forum and official websites of organizations such as the Islamic Community 
Millî Görüş contributed to gather support for these charity events. Yet the online-
installations created by Islam-Online in Second Life might stand most exemplarily for the 
mounting importance that is attributed by major Muslim actors to online media for 
enhancing Islamic activism. The creation of a ‚Palestinian Holocaust Memorial Mu-
seum‛ by Islam-Online – a popular religious online counseling service supervised by 
the controversial Egyptian-born Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi – made the case of Pales-
tine part of the virtual world of young technic-oriented Muslims.16 While the virtual 
site was meant to provide information about the ongoing conflict and to denounce the 
Israeli offensive, it also offered facilities to donate for the Palestinian population and to 
join an international campaign against the war (see Pic. 2). 
                                                          
14 See the website Samiyusuf.com. (accessed Apr. 13rd 2009) 
15 See the website Samiyusufofficial.com. (accessed Apr. 13rd 2009) 
16 Palestinianholocaust.net. (accessed Apr. 13rd 2009) 





While, for the time be-
ing, the actual use of 
Second Life among Muslim 
youngsters remains li-
mited, the efficiency of 
cyber activism in the name 
of Islam became visible 
during the recent war in 
Gaza. Depicting the use of 
the internet for the cause of 
Islam as the ‚jihad of our 
era‛17, even conservative 
clerics as Qaradawi have turned to the web for Islamic teaching and lobbying for caus-
es considered crucial to Muslims in the Islamic world, but in Europe as well. In this 
respect, the broad dissemination of calls to boycott Israeli products is particularly strik-
ing. While calls for boycotts have since long figured prominently on some Muslim 
websites, social community networks such as Facebook and StudiVZ have significantly 
extended their potential audience. Among the calls that were circulated on German-
Muslim websites during the war in Gaza, attacks against two major supermarket 
chains, Aldi and Lidl, achieved most attention. Claiming that the revenues of these 
companies were to be transferred to Israel, a short text message was posted in slight 
variations in online-forums, mailed in mass-emails and forwarded as SMS. One of 
these SMS read: „On January 10th, do not go shopping at Aldi or Lidl! The money will 
be donated to Israel! Please tell others! This information is from a brother who works 
as a Aldi branch manager!‛18  
In addition, several self-made videos were published on Youtube and MySpace to 
spread the information and to call people to refrain from shopping in the concerned 
supermarkets. While the accusations were soon criticized by some Muslim internauts 
as ridiculous, the rumor was obviously taken for real by many users; the massive dis-
semination of the rumor within the period of few days – with the same rumor also 
                                                          
17 Bettina Gräf, „IslamOnline.net: Independent, interactive, popular‚, Arab Media & Society (No. 4/2008). 
See also Abdallah El-Tahawy, ‛The internet is the new mosque. Fatwa at the click of a mouse‛, Arab Insight 
(Winter 2008): 11-19. 
18 See „Aldi, Lidl, Israel und die große Spendenaktion‚, musafira.de (9. Jan. 2009). 
 
Pic. 2: “Palestinian Holocaust Memorial Museum” in Second Life 





popping up among Dutch Mus-
lims – ultimately provoked both 
companies to publicly refute the 
claim and to deny any ties to 
Israel. 19  
As in other instances, the interest 
in and concern for Palestine as 
expressed in these calls for boy-
cott were not limited to the ac-
tual conflict. Depicting the Israeli 
offensive as an attack on ‚us‛, 
the calls for boycott implied the 
mobilization of the believers for 
the defense of a shared Muslim 
cause. Similar to the use of ‚Pa-
lestine‛ in other contexts, refer-
ences to the conflict alluded to a 
shared identity as Muslim be-
lievers and fostered the belonging to the umma. These allusions to ‚Palestine‛ clearly 
identified this community as a community under attack: It was not only for the popula-
tion in Palestine that these protests were perceived, but for Muslims as such. The Gaza 
war thus provided an exceptional opportunity to mobilize the collective and to appeal 
to the believers to contribute to the cause of the umma. (see Pic. 3)  Hence, the organiza-
tion of fundraising events and the collection of donations were not limited to charity, 
but appeared as part of a religiously sanctioned collective action against injustice and 
oppression. Echoing this perspective, Qaradawi explicitly insisted that donations to the 
population in Gaza were not due to humanitarian considerations; for him, these dona-
tions were a clear and unconditioned religious duty.20  
                                                          
19 See ‛Kritik am Aufruf zum Boykott von Aldi und Lidl‛, ufuq.de (Jan. 10th 2009). 
20 See his statement on Al-Jazeera (Jan. 25th 2009). The vast majority of Muslim voices in Germany that 
joined the protests did not imply any support for violent activities in solidarity with the population in 
Gaza. Yet, in some cases, and from within Salafist groupings in particular, the recent conflict in Gaza was 
used to glorify martyrdom in the name of Islam and to appeal to the ‚manhood‛ of Muslims in face of the 
attacks against Islam. See ‚Märtyrer und Paradies. Eine salafitische Stimme zum Krieg in Gaza‛, ufuq.de 
(Jan. 17th 2009).  
 
Pic. 3: „Are you still watching, or did you already get started 
to help?“ Cultural event organized by Islamische Denkfabrik 
in support of the Palestinian population in Gaza 
 





A striking feature of these activities in support of Palestine is the frequent link to the 
local conditions of Muslims and, though less often, immigrants in Germany. On many 
occasions, protests against Israel’s politics in the West Bank and Gaza are painted in 
colors of a broader struggle in defense of Islam and religious sentiments. In this re-
spect, claims of an one-sidedness of mainstream German politics and media towards 
Israel regularly featured in statements issued during the protests. While differing in 
extent and consequence, the suffering of the population in Gaza appears as reflecting a 
general attack on Islam that also tends to victimize Muslims in Europe. While perceiv-
ing Germany as a ‚hostile society‛21 that denies basic religious freedoms to Muslims 
and discriminates against them in schooling, the labor market and daily life, many 
Muslim youngsters thus face a dilemma. Even those youngsters who have been born in 
Germany and/or who do not necessarily consider themselves as Muslim are often iden-
tified as ‚Muslim‛ and ‚foreigners‛ by German mainstream society; while these 
youngsters see themselves as Germans, they are identified by their non-immigrant and 
non-Muslim surrounding with Islam. Irrespective of their actual integration into Ger-
man society, these youngsters are often labeled as a priori different. In this context, 
identification with non-Muslim society is considerably undermined, as became evident 
in a comprehensive study on the beliefs and opinions of Muslims in Germany: about 
two third of the young Muslim respondents felt ‚rather‛ or ‚only‛ bound to the coun-
try of origin of their parents,22 with religion and religious identity becoming an increa-
singly important concern among adolescent Muslims. 
The identification of youngsters with Arab or Turkish family background with a 
larger Muslim community and its supposed natural causes echoes this distance to 
mainstream society – and the discrimination and rejection they encounter within it. 
Some 36 % of young Muslims thus share the view that Muslims are rejected by Ger-
mans.23 Such assessments of discrimination might in some cases reflect projections and 
ideologically distorted perceptions of non-Muslim society; yet numerous studies on the 
image of Muslims and immigrants in German society have consistently documented 
the considerable support for anti-Muslim views articulated in private conversations, 
                                                          
21 The Change Institute: Studies into violent radicalization. The beliefs, ideologies and narratives (London, 2008): 
98-100. 
22 Brettfeld, Katrin /Wetzels, Peter: Muslime in Deutschland. Integration, Integrationsbarrieren, Religion sowie 
Einstellungen zu Demokratie, Rechtsstaat und politisch-religiös motivierter Gewalt (Berlin, 2007): 220. 
23 Brettfeld, Katrin /Wetzels, Peter: Muslime in Deutschland. Integration, Integrationsbarrieren, Religion sowie 
Einstellungen zu Demokratie, Rechtsstaat und politisch-religiös motivierter Gewalt (Berlin, 2007): 240. 





but also in parts of mainstream media and public debates.24 According to a recent 
study conducted among German youth, nearly two thirds of the non-immigrant res-
pondents considered the number of immigrants in Germany as too high.25 Support for 
openly racist stereotypes even in mainstream spectra of society is also discernable 
through the popularity of explicitly anti-Muslim websites that in recent years have 
strongly influenced public debates on Islam. With German-language weblogs such as 
Politically Incorrect attracting up to 40.000 visitors on a single day, the entries and com-
ments published on these sites echo massive – and often violent – resentments against 
Muslims and Islam.26  
 
Conclusion 
Being discriminated against – both as a Muslim and an immigrant – is an experience 
that many Muslim youngsters describe as being part of their daily life. In this regard, 
the conflict in Palestine for many appears as a symbol for a larger attack against Islam 
and the Muslim community. The identification with the cause of the Palestinians, often 
depicted as a just cause against injustice and oppression, allows fostering a sense of 
belonging to a larger collective. Interpreted as a religious duty in solidarity with fellow 
Muslims and in defense of Islam, the protests against the Gaza war in December 2008 
and January 2009 were thus not limited to solidarity with its victims, but echoed a gen-
eral discontent and sense of marginalization in Germany itself. In addition, the taking 
to the streets in protest against the war and engaging in grassroots initiatives in sup-
port of the Palestinian population should be seen in the context of the tight limits im-
posed on these youngsters’ political participation. With many of them being deprived 
of political rights, ‚Palestine‛ provides an effective stage to mobilize and to become an 
active subject in local public debates. Yet, this form of activism should not be mistaken 
for actual influence and an active role in public life. In fact, the anti-war protests of 
Muslims did not bring together ‚citizens‛, but ‚Muslims‛ – defined as members of a 
                                                          
24 See for instance: Antidiskriminierungsstelle des Bundes: Diskriminierung im Alltag. Wahrnehmung von 
Diskriminierung und Antidiskriminierungspolitik in unserer Gesellschaft (Heidelberg, 2008): 68-72 and Leibold, 
Jürgen/Kühnel, Steffen: Islamophobie oder Kritik am Islam, in: Heitmeyer, Wilhelm (ed.), Deutsche Zustän-
de Folge 6 (Frankfurt/Main, 2008): 95-115. 
25 Baier, Dirk/Pfeiffer, Christian/Simonson, Julia/Raubold, Susann: Jugendliche in Deutschland als Opfer und 
Täter von Gewalt (Hannover, 2009): 113. 
26 Shooman, Yasemin: Islamfeindschaft im World Wide Web, in: Benz, Wolfgang (ed.), Jahrbuch für Antise-
mitismusforschung 17 (Berlin, 2008): 69-96. 





religious community with a shared communal identity that does not necessarily match 
with mainstream society. As such, many of these protests did not necessarily aim at 
changing the situation in Gaza, but at staging communal loyalty and action. 
 
